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Abstract 
The Global Financial Crisis and the recent slowdown of China’s growth have led to 
questions about the sustainability of China’s growth. The argument is that, China is too 
dependent on external demand and that it needs to “rebalance” its economy toward 
domestic consumption. However, conventional measures of external: net exports-over-
GDP and exports-over-GDP are biased and do not accurately measure the contribution 
of external demand to GDP growth. In this paper, we propose two measures that are 
simple modifications of the conventional measures. We argue that our proposed 
measures provide a more accurate estimate of the vulnerability of China’s economy to 
external shocks, in the form of exports and FDI. Our estimates show that in 2001, 
exports and FDI accounted for 18.2% of GDP growth and by 2004 the share rose to 49 
percent. During 2005-2007, the contribution of exports and FDI to growth remained in 
the range of 38-40 percent. Our estimates also show that the impressive recovery of the 
Chinese economy in the post-crisis period owed at least 53% of its growth to exports 
and FDI. Based on these results, we conclude that the Chinese economy remains highly 
dependent on external demand in the form of exports and FDI, and re-balancing the 
economy towards domestic demand has not been achieved yet. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last three decades, the Chinese economy grew at around 10% annually. In 
2010, it overtook Japan as the second largest economy in the world. Exports and foreign 
direct investment have been performing a critical role in powering this rapid economic 
growth. The Chinese economy has been regarded as the new success story of the export-
led growth strategy, after Japan and the four Asian tigers: Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan. There exists a plethora of literature on the export/FDI and growth nexus in 
the context of the Chinese economy concluding that the Chinese economic growth has 
been highly dependent on external demand. The global financial crisis and the Euro-
zone crisis have revealed the vulnerability of the export-oriented growth model and 
have led to questions about the sustainability of China’s rapid growth. Rebalancing—
reorienting the Chinese economy from external demand to domestic demand, especially 
household consumption, has been proposed as a strategy for mitigating external shocks 
and maintaining long-term sustainable growth (IMF 2010, ADB 2009).  
Despite heated debates, few studies provide accurate numerical measure of the 
contribution of external demand to the Chinese economy. Investigating the exact 
contribution of external demand to Chinese GDP growth is crucial for understanding the 
urgency of rebalancing and the challenges of structural reform. Traditionally, net 
exports-over-GDP and exports-over-GDP have been used as a quantitative measure of 
the contribution of external demand to the economy.
3
 In this paper we will argue that 
both of these measures are biased. Net-exports underestimates the contribution of 
external demand to economic growth as it assumes all imports are for exports. This is 
the reason why The Economist (2007) claimed that the US downturn will not be too bad 
for the Chinese economy. On the contrary, China witnessed sharp slow-down in the 
second-half of 2008 and the first-half of 2012. The second measure of external demand, 
exports, ignores the foreign content of exports, and allocates all foreign value-added to 
the final exporting country. This leads to an overestimation of the contribution of 
external demand to GDP. This problem is especially critical for the case of China which 
imported US$322 billion worth of intermediate inputs to produce its exports in 2011.   
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 These measures are also reported in national accounts of most countries as a way to determine the 
dependence of the economy on external demand.  
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In this paper, we seek to reconcile this data inconsistency. We propose two 
approaches based on simple GDP accounting technique for China that will more 
precisely measure the contribution of external demand to GDP growth, and reflect the 
nature of China’s vulnerability to external shocks. In the next section, we provide a brief 
literature review on China’s export-led growth hypothesis. In section three, we elaborate 
on the problems with conventional methods of measuring external demand. Finally, in 
section four, we introduce two related approaches based on simple GDP accounting 
technique that will more accurately measure the contribution of exports and FDI to GDP. 
Using this framework also allow us to assess China’s efforts to “rebalance” its economy 
away from exports to domestic demand.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Theoretically, there is no general consensus on the role of exports and FDI on 
economic growth. It is indeed one of the most debated issues in the growth and 
development literature. In a Keynesian national accounts framework, net export 
represents external demand for the country’s output, which may lead to an increase in 
the country’s real output. Strictly speaking, this relationship between net exports and 
GDP is an accounting identity and does not imply causal relations. Various channels 
have been identified between exports/FDI and growth that has led to the export-led 
growth hypothesis and the thesis that an outward oriented economy promotes growth. 
Exports is expected to promote growth by relaxing balance of payments constraints and 
enhancing the country’s capacity to import essential intermediate and capital goods, 
promote specialization and productivity gains through access to knowledge spillovers, 
advanced technologies, learning-by-doing, better management practices etc. (Thirlwall 
1979, Melitz 2003, Helpman and Krugman 1985).  
The most important critique of the export- and FDI- led growth hypothesis is the 
argument that any correlation between FDI/Exports and GDP growth might be due to 
reverse causality. Countries which are growing at a rapid rate, by definition, produce 
more good and services and thus export more. Similarly, countries with a high rate of 
GDP growth attract more FDI seeking high returns. Another important critique of the 
export-led growth that has gained much traction in the today’s global environment is 
that export-led growth strategy suffers from fallacy of composition – all developing 
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countries cannot simultaneously pursue export-led growth strategy unless there is a 
comparable increase in demand from developed countries. Furthermore, the financial 
and sovereign debt crises in the US and the EU have highlighted risks associated with 
high exposure to the volatility to the world markets. These arguments have especially 
been emphasized in the case of China, a large economy which does not have the 
constraint of a small domestic market, like most other economies.  
Empirical evidence from export-led growth hypothesis is mixed. Tingvall and 
Ljungwall (2012) use a multi-country, meta-analysis and conclude that exports have 
contributed to the growth of Chinese economy more than in other countries. Shan and 
Sun (1998) examine data over 1987 and 1996 using an augmented growth equation and 
results show bidirectional Granger causality between exports and real industrial output 
in China. Similarly, Lui (2002) finds bidirectional causality between trade, FDI, and 
economic growth. Others like Jin, Lee, and Kim (2008) argue that the role of exports 
and foreign investment in China’s growth has been changing, they were more important 
from mid-1980s to early 1990s. However, from the 1990s to 2003, Jin et al find that 
knowledge and innovation variables have become more important. While, Tsen (2010) 
examines the relative importance of exports and domestic demand to economic growth 
using the Geweke (1982) methodology for China between 1978 and 2002. He concludes 
that there are bidirectional causality between external demand (measured by exports), 
domestic demand (measured by consumption and investment) and economic growth.  
The evidence for FDI-growth relationship is similarly mixed. Some have found 
causality running from FDI to economic growth. For example, Dees (2001) found 
positive effects of FDI on growth for the 1984-1995 time period. Similarly, Tang, 
Selvanathan, and Selvanathan (2008) found that FDI complemented domestic 
investment and promoted growth in China between 1978 and 2003. While other studies 
point to the reverse causality of economic growth attracting FDI into China. For 
example, Mah (2010) finds that for the 1983-2001 FDI did not cause growth, but that 
China’s growth attracted FDI to the country. Similarly, Zhao and Du (2007) find that 
FDI was attracted to China due to high growth instead of the other way round.  
Causality or not, the fact is that exports and FDI account for a large share of China’s 
GDP, while domestic consumption especially household consumption has been falling 
over the years. A sudden drop in exports and/or FDI will have a large negative impact 
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on China’s GDP and thus growth rate. In this paper, we will propose two measures that 
seek to measure this dependence of China on exports and FDI. As mentioned before, 
conventional measures of external demand are biased, our proposed measures will seek 
to correct this bias and provide a more accurate estimate. In the next section, we will 
discuss in detail the problems with conventional measures of external demand that lead 
to either an underestimation or overestimation of their importance to GDP growth. 
 
3. Flaws of the Conventional Measures of External Demand  
In standard national accounts, two measures i) share of net exports in GDP, the 
difference between exports and imports of goods and services, and ii) share of exports 
in GDP, are used as  proxies to measure the contribution of external demand to the 
economy. These measures either underestimate or overestimate the contribution of 
external demand to GDP and are thus biased.  Using net exports as a proxy for external 
demand simply assumes that all imports of goods and services are for exports, while in 
fact some imports might be for consumption and investment. It thus, ascribes all 
leakages from the economy through foreign goods and services to exports and ignores 
the leakage through consumption and investment. As a result, the contribution of 
external demand to economic growth is underestimated while that of consumption and 
investment is exaggerated. For instance, from 2001 to 2011, China’s exports grew at 
around 22 percent annually, but according to China Statistics Bureau, external demand 
only contributed between -3.5 to 2.6 percentage points to growth per year (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). The apparently low contribution contradicts 
assertions about China’s export driven economic growth.  
Using exports-over-GDP, the second measure, causes the opposite problem. If 
all value-added and inputs of the economy’s exports were produced domestically, the 
ratio could be used as a direct measurement on the contribution of external demand to 
GDP. However, modern international trade in manufacturing products is accomplished 
through global supply chains, in which companies located in various countries 
contribute to manufacturing a single product. Gross export often includes values for 
parts and components imported from other countries, thus fails to take into account the 
foreign content of exports. This is especially true for the case of China because of its 
central role in the East Asian production network. Many of the manufactured products 
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exported by China, in particular information and communication technology products 
such as computers and mobiles phones, are made of imported parts and components 
(Xing 2012). Processing imports—imported intermediate inputs for producing 
exports— have been a substantial part of China’s total imports. The share of processing 
imports was as high as 49% in 1997, which declined gradually and fell to 27% in 
2011(figure 1). In 2011, China imported over US$322 billion as intermediate inputs for 
producing its exports. The iPhone trade is a typical example. Despite the fact that 
Chinese workers contribute only US$6.5 to the manufacture of a 3G-iPhone, US$179 is 
credited to China’s gross exports whenever a 3G iPhone is shipped abroad (Xing and 
Detert 2010). Finally, both net exports and exports ignore the contribution of foreign 
investment to the economy. 
 
Figure 1: Processing Imports and its Share in Total Imports 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from China Customs  
 
The above discussion implies that both the conventional measures of external 
demand are biased. Figure 2 compares the real annual growth of FDI and exports with 
the percentage point contribution of net exports to the economy from 2002 to 2010. In 
2002, exports and FDI grew 21.7 percent and 11.9 percent respectively in real terms, but 
net exports was estimated to contribute merely 0.7 percentage points to the 9.1 percent 
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GDP growth. In 2005, despite the 22.7 percent real growth in exports and 2.6 percent in 
FDI, net exports was estimated to contribute a negative 4.9 percentage point to the 
overall growth of the economy! The estimated contributions of net exports are absurd 
and inconsistent with the persistent high growth and fail to support the general 
consensus of the important role of exports and FDI in China’s growth. It is misleading 
to use both net exports and exports to gauge the contribution of external demand to 
growth, and it is imperative to come up with a more accurate measure to understand the 
role of the external demand in the Chinese economy.  
 
Figure 2: Growth of Exports & FDI and Contribution of Net Exports to GDP 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the data from China Statistics Yearbook. 
 
A few others have recognized this measurement error, for example Akyuz 
(2011) suggests estimating import intensities of consumption, investment, and exports 
to obtain a more accurate estimate of the contribution of external demand to GDP 
growth. In the next section, we propose two simple GDP accounting techniques for 
China that utilizes available data and will more precisely measures the contribution of 
exports and FDI to GDP (Xing 2009). 
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4. Alternate Measures of External Demand  
In this section, we will propose two measures that we are a better measure the 
contribution of exports and FDI to China’s growth. We will use the standard Keynesian 
GDP accounting method which is often used by national accounts statisticians to 
analyze the contribution of consumption, investment, and exports to GDP. As 
emphasized before, these are accounting techniques, and do not imply any causal 
relations between the variables.  
The standard demand-side GDP accounting decomposes aggregate demand into 
consumption, investment, and net exports: 
                           (1) 
Where,  is consumption,  investment,  exports and imports. 
Net exports             and exports      are usually taken as a measure of the 
contribution of external demand to GDP. However, as discussed before exports need to 
be adjusted for their import content. Fortunately for the case of China, trade data is 
divided into two parts: processing and ordinary. All imported intermediate inputs used 
for producing exports are recorded as processing imports. We can separate imports 
servicing domestic demand from imports for producing exports. Following this 
classification, we divide total imports into—processing and ordinary: 
           
     
        (2) 
Where,     denotes processing imports and      ordinary imports to meet the demand 
of domestic consumption and investment. 
The first measure of external demand that we propose is,  
M 1:            
 
                                                     (3) 
This modification allows us to account for processing imports while sticking 
closely with the conventional measure. As mentioned before, this accounting 
modification is important especially in the case of China, as at its peak, processing 
imports accounted for close to 50 percent of its imports. We believe this will give us a 
lower-bound on the contribution of external demand on the Chinese economy as it 
ignores the role of FDI.  
Besides exports, foreign direct investment to China can also be considered an 
important component of eternal demand. As FDI is a significant component of China’s 
Ct I t EXt IM t
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GDP, fluctuations in FDI can have a large impact on GDP. To take into account this 
vulnerability of China to external shocks through FDI, we will include FDI in our 
second measure. Including investment in external demand raises a knotty issue: in 
essence we would be assuming that all investments made by foreign funds are used to 
manufacture goods and services for foreign consumption, while investments made by 
domestic funds are used to produce goods for domestic consumption. However, this is 
increasingly untrue as many companies invest in China not just for its abundance of 
cheap labor but also to access to its large market. China has emerged as the largest 
market for consumer vehicles, with foreign brands dominating around 70 percent of the 
market. Similarly, China is an important market for consumer electronics: it is the 
second largest market for Apple, and is expected to over-take the US as the largest 
market.
4
  
There are also issues related to secondary or multiplier effects of foreign-
consumption-based investment in the economy. For example the increased employment 
generated by establishing a new factory, would raise the disposable income of the 
workers employed and thus demand for goods and services, which will have a positive 
impact on GDP. It is indeed very difficult to calculate the contribution of investment to 
the GDP, which is further complicated by the growing importance of China as a market 
rather than world factory. We neither have firm-level data to estimate the share of FDI 
and domestic investment that is used to manufacture goods for domestic consumption, 
nor do we have estimates of the multiplier effects of FDI. Given these data limitations, 
once again we use the simple GDP accounting framework to estimate the primary 
impact of an external shock through exports and FDI to the Chinese GDP.  
Continuing our framework, we divide total investment in the economy into two 
parts—investment through foreign funds and domestic funds:  
     
    
        (4) 
Substituting (2) and (4) into (1) and rearranging the terms yields: 
           
     
          
     
                                               (5) 
                                                 
4
 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e60b68e2-5b51-11e2-9d4c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2PwLVdRo7 
The recent apology by the CEO of Apple for the company’s warranty and repair policies in China 
highlights the growing importance of the Chinese market. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-
01/apple-ceo-cook-apologizes-for-china-iphone-warranties.html 
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The first term       
     
   is domestic consumption and investment adjusted for 
leakage via imports. It measures the actual demand of domestic consumption and 
investment for domestic outputs. The second term represents the share of exports and 
foreign investment in China’s GDP, and is the proposed second measure of China’s 
vulnerability to external shock. 
M 2:           
     
 
                                                    (6) 
If we let, Domestic demand:            
      
    and  
External demand:             
      
 
, then identity (4) can be simplified as:  
                     (7) 
The real GDP growth rate  can be calculated as 
             
        
         (8) 
Where, 
     
            
      
  real growth rate of GDP at year t; 
  
    
         
     
   real growth rate of domestic demand at year t; 
  
    
          
     
  real growth rate of external demand at year t; 
        
     
      
, weight of external demand in the GDP at year t-1; and  
            
     
      
 , weight of domestic demand in the GDP at year t-1 
Equation (8) decomposes GDP growth of the Chinese economy into two measurable 
components:        
  measures the percentage point contribution of the exports and FDI 
to GDP growth, while            
 
  is the percentage point contribution of domestic 
demand to GDP growth.  
 
5. Our Estimates  
In this section we present estimates of our proposed measures (M1 and M2) and 
compare them to conventional measures of external demand.  We apply actually utilized 
gt
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FDI as a proxy for foreign investment (  
 
)
5
. Data for GDP, consumption, gross capital 
formation, exports, and imports are retrieved from various issues of China Statistics 
Yearbook. Data for processing imports     are provided by China’s Customs General.  
Fluctuations of the exchange rates between the Yuan and the Dollar affect 
estimated growth rates of external demand. Specifically, when the Yuan depreciates 
against the dollar, the calculated growth of external demand tends to be higher in Yuan 
than in dollars. Since the variables measured in Yuan—consumption and domestic 
investment—are comparatively larger than variables measured in US dollars—FDI, 
processing trade— to minimize the error due to exchange rate fluctuations, we convert 
all variables into Yuan. Average exchanges rates of the Yuan to the Dollar, published in 
China Statistics Yearbook are used for the conversion.  
 
Table 1: Conventional measures vs. our estimates 
 exports/GDP M2/ GDP M1/ GDP net exports/ GDP 
1994 20.75 18.73 12.93 0.92 
1995 19.70 16.30 11.35 2.22 
1996 16.96 15.25 10.57 1.37 
1997 18.57 16.27 11.68 4.11 
1998 17.59 15.42 11.07 4.16 
1999 17.73 14.84 11.17 2.66 
2000 20.90 16.95 13.54 2.02 
2001 20.20 17.05 13.49 1.71 
2002 22.37 18.07 14.45 2.09 
2003 26.56 20.57 17.33 1.53 
2004 30.51 23.20 20.08 1.66 
2005 33.43 25.07 22.43 4.47 
2006 34.84 26.68 24.43 6.39 
2007 35.10 27.90 25.77 7.60 
2008 31.77 26.55 24.52 6.60 
2009 23.52 19.44 17.67 3.85 
2010 26.57 22.02 20.24 3.06 
2011 26.46 22.00 20.39 2.16 
Source: authors’ own calculations 
 
                                                 
5
 Actually utilized foreign investment is divided into three components: foreign direct investment, foreign 
loan, and other foreign investment. Data for foreign loan is not available from 2001. To keep the data 
consistent, we use FDI as a proxy for foreign investment. FDI makes up between 78-99% of annul foreign 
investment during 1994-2011.  
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Table 1 reports compares the conventional measures of external demand to our 
measures MI and M2 as a share of GDP. As expected, our estimates are lower than 
estimates using exports/GDP and higher than estimates using net exports/GDP. Our 
results suggest that the Chinese economy remains highly dependent on exports and FDI. 
The economy is extremely vulnerable to external shocks; any significant external shock 
could slow down the economy substantially. Given the high level of the growth 
dependence of the economy on the external demand, it is unrealistic to expect the 
Chinese economy can be re-oriented to domestic demand in the short run.  
 
Table 2: The Contribution of external demand to China’s GDP growth 
Year 
ED/ GDP  
     ) 
ED growth 
 (  
 ) 
% point contribution of ED 
to GDP growth (       
 ) 
GDP 
growth  
(  ) 
% contribution of 
ED to GDP 
growth  
        
      
1994 0.13 62.5 8.1 12.7 63.9 
1995 0.19 -3.6 -0.7 10.7 -6.4 
1996 0.16 3.1 0.5 10.2 4.9 
1997 0.15 15.8 2.4 8.5 28.4 
1998 0.16 1.3 0.2 6.9 3.0 
1999 0.15 2.7 0.4 6.7 6.1 
2000 0.15 21.3 3.2 6.2 51.0 
2001 0.17 8.8 1.5 8.2 18.2 
2002 0.17 16.5 2.8 9.8 28.5 
2003 0.18 25.8 4.7 10.5 44.3 
2004 0.21 24.3 5.0 10.2 49.0 
2005 0.23 21.1 4.9 12.1 40.6 
2006 0.25 21.9 5.5 14.5 37.9 
2007 0.27 16.3 4.3 11.2 38.8 
2008 0.28 4.6 1.3 10.0 13.0 
2009 0.27 -18.7 -5.0 11.1 -44.9 
2010 0.19 22.7 4.4 8.3 53.1 
2011 0.22 7.2 1.6 7.3 21.8 
Source: authors’ own calculations 
 
In Table 2 we report estimates of the contribution of the newly defined external 
demand (M2), which is the sum of adjusted exports and FDI inflows, to China’s growth 
rate for the period 1994-2010. In 1994, M2 rose by over 62% and accounted for almost 
64% of China’s GDP growth. The exceptional high external growth was partially due to 
the sharp devaluation of the Chinese Yuan, from 5.8 Yuan/US$ to 8.6 
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Yuan/US$ between 1993 and 1994. The devaluation magnified the annual increase of 
both exports and FDI inflows when measured in Chinese Yuan. China joined the WTO 
in 2001, until then, the growth of external demand was quite volatile and the 
dependence of the economy on external demand was moderate. Excluding 1994, only in 
one year (2000), more than one third of the growth was generated from external demand. 
In 1995, although exports and FDI expanded, so did nominal external demand, however 
a high inflation rate translated to negative growth for external demand. The high 
contribution of 51 percent by external demand to GDP growth in 2000 was due to rapid 
expansion of exports. Chinese exports grew by more than 28% in nominal terms in 2000. 
We can also observe that dependence of the economy on external demand gradually 
increased in the post WTO era.  
External demand grew steadily and maintained a two-digit annual growth rate 
until the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008. The estimates suggest that, the 
weight of external demand in the economy increased gradually during this period: in 
2001 external demand accounted for 18.3% of GDP growth, by 2004 almost half of the 
10.2% GDP growth could be attributed to external demand. During the period 2005 to 
2007, share of external demand dropped slightly, but remained in the range of 38-40%. 
In the second half of 2008, the Global Financial Crisis disrupted China’s exports and 
inflows of foreign direct investment. Consequently, external demand grew by merely 
4.6% and its contribution to overall economic growth fell sharply to 13%. Global 
economic turmoil continued into 2009, and drove external demand to fall by 18.7%. In 
2010, external demand recovered and rose by 22.7%, accounting for 53% of the 
economic growth of that year. 
 
6. Testing the Reliability of the Estimates 
How reliable are the estimates? As our decomposition approach is derived from 
the standard GDP accounting framework, theoretically there should be no concerns. It is 
possible that significant discrepancy may exist due to exchange rates and other data 
inaccuracies. To test the reliability of our approach and estimates, we first estimate 
growth rate of external and domestic demand separately, then calculate the 
corresponding GDP growth ( gt ) (see table 3). The estimated gt  is compared with the 
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growth rate calculated directly from the GDP data by expenditure method published in 
China Statistics Yearbook. As expected, the two growth rates match exactly. 
As mentioned before, we follow the expenditure approach to GDP accounting. 
The China Statistics Bureau calculates GDP growth using the production method, 
although it publishes GDP figures based on both expenditure and production method. It 
is an interesting exercise to compare the growth rates calculated from the two different 
approaches. The comparison may provide further evidence on the reliability of our 
estimates.  Figure 3 compares the growth rates between 1994 and 2011 based on the two 
approaches. As we can see the difference between the two approaches is quite large, 
especially in recent years. It is common to have some discrepancies between GDP 
calculations using different methods. There may be several reasons for this, for example 
because they are based on different data sources and thus face different limitations in 
data collection etc. However, if we examine figure 3 closely, we can observe a clear lag  
 
Table 3: Testing the reliability of the estimates 
Year 
% point contribution of ED 
to GDP growth 
          
   
% point contribution of DD 
to GDP growth 
           
  
GDP growth  
   
1994 8.12 4.58 12.7 
1995 -0.68 11.39 10.7 
1996 0.50 9.73 10.2 
1997 2.40 6.06 8.5 
1998 0.21 6.71 6.9 
1999 0.41 6.26 6.7 
2000 3.16 3.04 6.2 
2001 1.49 6.70 8.2 
2002 2.81 7.03 9.8 
2003 4.66 5.87 10.5 
2004 4.99 5.20 10.2 
2005 4.89 7.16 12.1 
2006 5.48 8.99 14.5 
2007 4.35 6.86 11.2 
2008 1.30 8.68 10.0 
2009 -4.96 16.02 11.1 
2010 4.41 3.89 8.3 
2011 1.59 5.70 7.3 
Source: authors’ own calculations  
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effect between the expenditure approach and the production approach. Specifically, the 
low growth in expenditure is consistently followed by the low growth of the output. The 
lag effect is consistent with standard dynamics of macroeconomics models. From a 
policy standpoint, this is reasonable to expect as government interventions through 
monetary or fiscal policy interventions may show up in the expenditure data 
comparatively faster, but may take a while to affect output.  
 
Figure 3: GDP growth rates by expenditure and production methods   
 
 Source: The authors’ calculation based on China Statistics Yearbook  
 
For example, in November 2008 the Chinese government announced a massive 
economic stimulus package of 4 trillion Yuan, equivalent to about 16% of China’s GDP. 
The effect of this stimulus package can be seen in the 2009 expenditure data; the 
expenditure based GDP grew 11.2 percent while the output based GDP rose only by 9.2 
percent, 0.8 percentage points lower than the preceding year.  As there may be a lag for 
this fiscal intervention to affect output, it shows up in the 2010 production data; the 
output based GDP grew 10.4 percent in 2010, 1.2 percentage higher than previous year. 
Similarly, in 2007 China carried out a series of contractionary monetary policies to slow 
down the overheated economy. The deposit interest rate was progressively increased 
from 2.52 percent in August 2006 to 4.14 percent by the end of 2007. In addition, the 
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required reserve ratio was increased 10 times by 0.5 percent each time from November 
2006 to December 2007, to jump from a low 8.5 percent to 13.5 percent. Again, this 
radical dis-acceleration of the economy shows up in the 2007 expenditure data as it 
immediately reduced both supply and demand of bank loans, and dampened overall 
expenditure in particular investment spending, but not in the 2007 production data. This 
explains the big difference in growth rates between the two methods in 2007---the 
expenditure based GDP growth dropped sharply to 11.2 percent compared with 14.5 
percent the proceeding, while the growth of the output based GDP accelerated to 14.2 
percent.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In the post-crisis environment, sustainability of China’s growth pattern has been 
highly debated. The argument is that, China is too dependent on external demand and 
that it needs to “rebalance” its economy toward domestic consumption. However, the 
commonly used ways of measuring the contribution of external demand to the economy 
is biased. Net exports underestimates the contribution of external demand as imports are 
deducted from exports, even though they are used in-part for domestic consumption and 
investment. While exports overestimates the contribution of external demand by 
assuming the entire value-added of exports are produced domestically. In this paper, we 
propose two measures that are based on simple modification of the conventional 
measures. We argue that our proposed measures provide a more accurate measure of the 
vulnerability of China’s economy to fluctuations in the form of exports and FDI share of 
external demand in China’s economy. Our estimate suggests that, the dependence of the 
Chinese economy on external demand increased significantly after its entry to the WTO 
in 2001. The contribution of exports and FDI to the growth of the economy rose from 
18 percent in 2001 to its peak at 49 percent in 2004. As the growth of exports and FDI 
slowed down in 2008, the growth rate of GDP fell sharply. However, in the post-crisis 
period, the Chinese economy remained highly dependent on the external demand. As 
exports and FDI together contributed to over 53 percent to the impressive recovery of 
the Chinese economy in 2010. Our results are important in the context of present 
debates on the sustainability of China’s growth as it implies that China is still highly 
17 
 
vulnerable to fluctuations in external demand, in terms of both exports and FDI, and 
rebalancing of the economy towards domestic demand has not been achieved yet. 
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